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PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY: SCIENCE DESTRUC- 
TIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
VERY man has a philosophy of life. T h e  philosophy E of some folks is meagre enough; others keep the 
different aspects of theirs in watertight compartments. T h e  
great prophet, poet or  teacher is he who can break down 
these compartments, give free play to  the floods of actuality 
that pour in on every side, and yet not (like lesser men) be 
overwhelmed in the turmoil. H e  will take these violent 
but vital streams, combine their flow, use their fuIl head 
of water for  power, distribute them in peaceful runlets 
for  the irrigation of new fields of life or  old fields grown 
barren through the drying of the old springs. For  let us 
not forget the world never stands still; to each generation 
the old problems come in new forms, with new problems on 
their heels. Bergson had the poet’s insight in his vision of 
evolution as a creative thing. T h e  new, the not-to-be- 
prophesied is constantly coming into being, does continu- 
ously arise from the old and the familiar. Tha t  is true not 
merely for  the slow workings of animal evolution; much 
more is it true for the rapid changes of human civilization. 
In  this last century of human years, great and bewildering 
changes have been made both in man’s understanding of 
himself and external nature, and in the material basis 
of his life-greater and more bewildering than in any 
other century of which we have record. These changes 
demand a new outlook and a new philosophy; and it is of 
308 
Philosophical Biology 309 
the contribution of biology to  this new outlook that I wish 
here to  speak. 
I n  the first place, there is the realization of change 
itself, of the fact that  society, like other organisms, must 
change if it is not t o  stagnate. There are organisms, like 
the lamp-shell Lingula, which have not changed for ten 
million years; but such are extremely rare. T h e  law for 
the vast majority of species is change. T h a t  is especially 
true for those of generalized plastic nature; and man is 
preeminent, thanks to  the construction of his brain, in 
plasticity. 
There seems for man, as for  most organisms, t o  be no 
escape from one of two alternatives. Either he must be 
going somewhere, or  he must be like the old darkey in the 
story, who when asked where he was going, said, “Ain’t 
going nowheres, I’se been gone where I’m gwine to”. (One 
knows both individuals and nations who seem to have 
already gone where they were going to!) 
T h e  fact that the world never stands still is, t o  be sure, 
a chestnut of experience; but none the less important for 
that. Very often reason’s contribution to a problem lies 
in providing an intelligible basis for some dimly-perceived 
familiar truth, in making its boundaries clearer and in 
seeing precisely how it operates. Biology does this for our 
general notion that the world does not stand still. 
T h e  discovery of the fact of evolution made change in 
the law of the organic world; and from a study of evolution 
we are enabled to  say something as to the meaning of change 
for  life. 
By this we are shaken out of any conceit we might have 
that this is the best of all possible worlds, and made to see 
that, as I said yesterday, we are become the trustees of 
evolutionary progress; and that any state of the world in 
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which men and women are so far,  as they are in the present, 
from realizing more fully the possibilities that are in them 
is very f a r  from the end of its evolutionary course. There 
are actually people who hold up the existing order of society 
as divinely ordained and therefore presumably ideal. Such 
an attitude is, presumably, in most cases, the mere rational- 
ization of a fear of change, but it is nevertheless pernicious. 
T h e  real problem is to  strike the balance between stabil- 
ity and change-to make change itself regular. This  has 
its practical bearings. Mr. Trot ter  in his book on the 
“Herd  Instinct” has pointed out that one real classification 
of human types is into the stable-minded and the unstable- 
minded: that  the latter are those who produce most of the 
great discoverers and reformers, the former most of 
the administrators and business men. Further, that  the 
greater the innovators and reformers, the more are they 
usually attacked and reviled during their lifetime; and 
that the chief practical power and the bulk of wealth are 
in the hands of the stable-minded. 
Our problem is to  encourage the unstable-minded to  make 
their discoveries and point the way to  their reforms without 
letting them pull the whole fabric about their own and 
other people’s ears; and this calls for a toleration that is 
even a t  present rare. 
Apropos of this toleration, let me quote a passage I 
recently came across in Bernard Shaw’s preface to St. Joan, 
since it is relevant to  much of my later argument: under 
the section-heading, “The Law of Change is the Law of 
God”, we read, “In short, though all society is founded on 
intolerance, all improvement is founded on tolerance, or 
the recognition of the fact that the law of evolution is 
Ibsen’s law of change. And as the law of God in any sense 
of the word which can now command a faith proof against 
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science is a law of evolution, it follows that the law of God 
is a law of change, and that when the churches set them- 
selves against change, as such, they are setting themselves 
against the law of God.” 
T h e  greatest of the last century’s changes lies in the new 
outlook on nature and man’s relation to  nature-in other 
words, in the theology of his religion, since religion is the 
response of human personality to  the outer universe of 
experience, and theology is our attempt to give an intel- 
lectual statement of that  relation, and build a rational basis 
for our beliefs. 
There have been in the past two main phases through 
which man has passed in regard to  this question: the period 
of magic, fetichism, and primitive animism, and the period 
of theism. 
In  the first period, whch must have started as soon as 
man was truly man, and began to  try his reasoning powers, 
magic appears to have been the guiding principle of his 
existence. 
Anthropology studies the habits of 
every primitive people, and compares them with the curious 
survivals found in the highest civilizations. For  want of a 
better term, the anthropologist uses magic to  denote 
a certain set of practices which he finds in use. T o  be sure, 
they appear in a bewildering multiplicity of form, but 
analysis shows that all issue from a common cause-which 
in its turn is a particular theory of the nature of things. 
Magic in its first, or fetichistic development, consists in 
ascribing supernatural attributes to physical objects such 
as stones or  skulls or  the skins of animals-in endowing 
them with a spirit-life and a share of the power which 
primitive man felt and feared moving in the world about 
him. Psychologically, the operation seems to  be this. 
Wha t  is magic? 
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An object arouses emotion; the primitive mind, not yet 
arrived a t  full distinction between subject and object, 
ascribes to  the object some of the spiritual life which was 
manifested in the emotion. W e  too often do something 
very like this, and not only in our childhood. 
Secondly, it implies the belief that  by symbolic and ritual 
practice the powers of nature can be forced or  propitiated 
to the fulfillment of human desires. 
Both these beliefs long survived their first crude mani- 
festations, and, with the necessary modifications, overlapped 
into the theistic period. 
In  this stage, further, men appear t o  have made no clear 
distinction between matter and spirit; they projected their 
own emotions into the objects which happened to  arouse 
emotion. Religion of this type is an external thing like a 
patent medicine-it is, indeed, only a spiritual patent medi- 
cine. T h e  great reform made by the Hebrew prophets 
was in urging the uselessness and stupidity of such a religion. 
Gradually, it would seem, the Magic theory was found 
to  be insufficient. Objects themselves came to  be regarded 
as lifeless and passive; the spirit and the power that man 
felt in his confrontation of the world was taken out of 
objects and placed behind them, on a new plane. So was 
called into existence a world of spiritual beings, whose wills 
were supposed to control the actions of brute matter, of 
beasts, and of men. 
This step was of profound importance, since it meant 
the severance of the bond in human belief between matter 
and arbitrary will. T w o  effects inevitably followed- 
slowly, and with pain and effort, but inevitably. On  the one 
hand, Science was born. Matter  itself became for  the 
first time truly material. U p  till then, it had been regarded 
as itself the seat of supernatural powers, incalculable, 
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irresponsible, illimitable ; thus thought of as holy and 
mysterious, it was shielded by the powerful barriers of 
human emotion, by fear and longing and adoration, from 
any cold and dispassionate scrutiny. 
But with the transfer of this supernatural power to  
separate supernatural beings, cold and dispassionate scrutiny 
of matter was no longer sacrilegious. Thus began the 
process which first emerged from its chrysalis in ancient 
Greece, as the scientific study of nature, and which in the 
last few centuries has trained its wings to  ever greater and 
more astounding flights. 
But as human reason worked on matter, so it could not 
help working on the powers which it perceived behind 
matter. As matter became better known, more controllable, 
so the spiritual beings who were thought t o  direct its activi- 
ties were thought t o  be less capricious, more human, fewer 
in number. As human thought became more conscious of 
itself, as justice and pity, reason and purpose came to have 
more part  in determining action, so, too, the nature of the 
imagined spiritual beings changed, and changed in the same 
direction. 
Look a t  the gods of any advanced polytheistic people, 
such as the ancient Egyptians or  Greeks. They are easily 
seen to  be of compound nature. In  part  they are a deification 
of the powers with which the people are perpetually striv- 
ing, a projection of the idea of human personality into the 
forces of nature; and for the rest they are a wish-fulfill- 
ment, a deification of human ideals-ideals given the vic- 
tory, wishes made to  come true by being given life among 
the gods. 
Later  there came a gradual unification of our ideas con- 
cerning matter. Different kinds of matter were seen to  
change one into the other, different kinds of energy to be 
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transmutable. T h e  conception of a uniformity of nature 
underlying all material phenomena came into being. 
So in respect of our ideas of spirit. If all the diversity 
of material fact were the manifestation of a single matter, 
then the diverse powers seen operating through matter must 
be manifestations of a single spiritual being. Then, too, 
the unity of mind was better realized, and at  the same time 
the units of human society enlarged. And so the little gods 
died or  merged in new and greater-the individual fetich, 
the family Lares and Penates, the tribal gods like 
early Jehovah, the gods of place like the Roman Termini, 
the gods of special time or season like Adonis, of a trade 
like Mercury, or  of one aspect of the human mind, like 
Pallas Athene-the splendor of all these faded, and their 
life was sucked out of them-into beings of greater splendor 
and fuller life. 
Finally, in due course of time, both scientific and religious 
thought came to the terminus of their advance, a bound 
beyond which no further progress was possible without a 
change of fundamental idea. Science has brought us to 
the final uniformity of natural law, the unity of all matter 
and all energy: religion has brought us to the most thor- 
oughgoing monotheism, in which not only is a single spir- 
itual being supposed to be behind all material happenings, 
but all logical consequences of ascribing personality to such 
a being are worked out to their conclusion. And the 
two systems in their simple and unmodified forms are 
incompatible. 
We stand now a t  the threshold of a new phase of human 
outlook on nature; science seemed to have brought us to  a 
locked door, but now science herself is forging the key to 
that door. Let us see a little more clearly how matters 
stand, Physics and chemistry, as was natural, took the first 
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great step. Both matter and energy were found to  be in- 
destructible, and every form of either to be interchangeable 
with other forms. T h e  last twenty-five years’ work in 
physics has put the final story on the building. Matter  
is not only indestructible, but all of it is literally one; as 
all the millions of different substances are built up of a few 
dozen elements, so these elements are built up of units of 
the one pre-elemental stuff. T h e  different elements repre- 
sent essentiaIIy but so many different numerical arrange- 
ments of identical units, the electrons ; and these electrons, 
though the basis of matter, are the basis of energy, too. 
And so all material phenomena come back to arrangement 
and movement of the eternal army of electrons. As cor- 
ollary of this, scientific uniformitarianism and determinism 
is justified and enthroned. In  the realm of matter, there is 
no longer room for any miracle, save for  the eternal miracle 
of existence itself. 
With one gesture she links life 
with not-life, showing that the same matter and the same 
energy is in both, and in both works in the same way. With 
another she gives us evolution, thus linking all life in one, 
and further posing the question of mind’s relation with life, 
and so with matter. 
Evolution and physiology, together, extend over the 
whole field of life the operation of the same natural laws 
which physics and chemistry found fo r  dead matter. T h a t  
is not t o  say that no further natural laws exist in life, but 
that  the physico-chemical laws are the same in all nature. 
Subsequently the sciences of animal behavior and psy- 
choIogy came into being, and showed that mind, too, was a 
proper subject for  science-with what results I shall attempt 
to  show later. 
For  the present let us confine ourselves to biology. W h a t  
Then comes biology. 
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of ourselves does she show us in her glass? She dethrones 
man from an old throne, t o  seat him on a new. Before 
Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, our earth was the centre 
of the universe-or was, fo r  us, the centre; they, and later 
astronomers, have made it nothing but a minor planet of 
a minor star in one out of a myriad cosmic systems. But 
man continued central. W h a t  matter if earth were but a 
planet? M a n  was still the objective of creation, the mean- 
ing of the scheme. Right up to  the middle of the last cen- 
tury, the most eminent men of science could and did continue 
to discuss the properties of matter, the nature of the earth, 
and its animal and plant inhabitants solely from the stand- 
point of their utility to this egotistic human demigod. 
From this self-erected pedestal he was cast down by Lye11 
and Darwin. They threw their searchlight into the dark 
places, and it was a t  once seen that neither the earth nor 
its animals and plants had been created to serve and minister 
t o  man. T h e  oak or  the vine, the dog o r  the horse, existed 
because they were fit to exist, because capable of survival; 
the life of each living thing was centred, though uncon- 
sciously, upon its own ends only, and the capacity to live 
was sufficient and sole justification for  its presence on earth. 
Not  merely this, but more: not only were they not created 
with human needs in view, but man came into being in a 
certain real sense with reference to  them. 
H e ,  like all other living things, must be adapted to  the 
world he lives in. This means that his attributes, both phy- 
sical and mental, have been, and are, continually being 
molded to fit the world in which he lives. Thus, f a r  from 
the world having been deliberately shaped to  go with the 
character of the star actor, this actor himself owes his very 
nature and his part  in the play to the pressure of the world 
and the ages of its slow, blind molding. No t  only that, 
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but if evolution is the fact it so indubitably proclaims itself, 
then there is no reason to suppose that the evolutionary 
process has reached its limit in man-he is an unfinished 
as well as a one-sided being. 
Here we have the principle which may be called biological 
relativity. Man’s nature, like that of all other organisms, 
can be understood only in relation to the rest of his world, 
living and not-living; if that had been different, he would 
have been different. If there had been no beasts of prey, 
his sense of fear would have never developed as it actually 
did; if X-rays were not absent in nature, but had been pass- 
ing through our atmosphere abundantly like light, he would 
have possessed sense-organs to  detect them, and a skin to  
keep them from penetration; if sugar were poisonous, and 
yet as common in nature as it actually is, we should be so 
constructed as t o  find sweetness profoundly disagreeable. 
Bergson took the most far-reaching step in this direction 
when he pointed out that the very methods of our intellect, 
the particular ways in which our reason works, appear t o  
have been developed in relation to  the material necessities of 
life, t o  the need for  controlling the behavior of separate 
material objects. T h e  intuitional side of thought has had 
relatively little survival value in the critical early evolution 
of man, and remains to  this day under-develop,ed. 
Meanwhile comparative psychology, studying the be- 
havior and mind of animals, shows the line along which 
mental evolution has progressed. Retentiveness of memory, 
readiness of associations, efficiency and variety of sense- 
organs (the entrance channels of all knowledge), intensity 
of feeling and of will-all these, starting from the mechan- 
ical uniformity of response and narrowness of knowledge 
seen in the lowest organisms, have gradually increased. 
Recent work has especially emphasized one point: that 
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higher animals are enabled to  comprehend and act intelli- 
gently when faced with situations which are  too complex 
f o r  lower animals. Stand in an enclosure of wire netting 
with the door open behind you and throw some food over 
the wire. I f  you have a dog with you, it will, after a few 
ineffectual attempts to  get through the wire, grasp the situ- 
ation and make off through the door and round. A child 
of eight would have gone straight round; but the average 
barndoor fowl will never grasp the situation as a whole, 
and continues to make ineffectual efforts t o  get through 
until it is tired. 
W h a t  is there to  prevent the evolution of a brain and 
mind as much more capable than ours of complex grasp as 
is ours than a hen’s? Already in men of genius we see ad- 
umbrations of such power. Mozart ,  in some way as un- 
conveyable by words to  lesser minds as is sight t o  a blind 
man, tells us that he could experience the whole of one of 
his symphonies in one instant of time ; great mathematicians 
often see the answer to a problem in a flash, and then have 
to  spend days in verifying it step by step; the great mystic 
gathers all his knowledge and all his feeling in a point of 
aspiration and contemplation, and enjoys an experience 
unknown to  smaller minds. 
M a n  thus becomes a product of the evolutionary mill 
like any other. Like the snail or the pine-tree, the tiger 
or  the duckweed, he exists, and existence is his justification 
no more and no less than it is theirs. He might have been 
stronger, with more avenues of knowledge, o r  incapable of 
fear or anger, or endowed with a comprehension beyond 
that of genius; he is, in actuality, a product of his environ- 
ment, and a product a t  a definite and not necessarily very 
high level of development. 
And so he has been turned out of that throne. But there 
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is another, in which we may justly install him. T h e  study 
of the actual course of evolution, as revealed in fossils, in 
embryos, in comparative anatomy, shows clearly enough 
that evolutionary change has not been completely a t  ran- 
dom, but that it has a chief direction. Through the millions 
of years during which life has existed on this planet, there 
has been an increase in certain properties of life, or, more 
accurately, in their maximum level. These properties are 
size (up to  a certain limit), efficiency, complexity, harmony 
of parts;  and on the mental side memory, power of learn- 
ing, greater intensity of emotion and of will. You can 
sum them up under the still more general heads of greater 
independence, greater control, greater intensity of mental 
process. This  increase has not been universal. Some types 
appear to have remained stationary, others to branch 
out all on the same level, others to  specialize up blind 
alleys of complexity, others to  degenerate into sedentary 
sloth o r  shapeless parasitism. But the maximum level 
of the qualities I have mentioned goes on increasing 
from epoch to epoch. T h e  direction may appear to be 
reversed, the whole scheme of progress overturned, as when 
the marvellous great beasts of the age of reptiles were 
extinguished and their places taken by the early mam- 
mals, smaller and less powerful. Yet the whole mammalian 
plan was more advanced than the reptilian, and the tempo- 
rary reverse was a necessary preface to  further advance- 
advance which would have been impossible but for  two new 
characters brought in by mammals, warm blood and the 
nourishment of the young by the mother, pre-natally in the 
womb, later by the mother’s milk. 
I n  spite of degeneration and temporary reversal, the ad- 
vance a t  the highest level was continued; and it is this 
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evolutionary direction which we may, I think justly, call 
biological progress. 
Wha t  is our justification? T h e  fact that there is a direc- 
tion in evolution is remarkable enough. But progress is 
more than direction, it is movement in the right direc- 
tion. And we are legitimately using the word progress here, 
since the direction in which pre-human evolution on the 
whole has moved in the past is the same as that which is 
in our human minds when we speak of progress. 
If then we look again a t  man in the light of this new idea 
of evolutionary progress, we find more reason for congrat- 
ulation. M a n  may be a mere spurt thrown out by evolv- 
ing life in its blind course, he may be only a step towards 
as yet undreamed-of possibilities-but whatever he be, 
he has one actual and tangible claim: he is the highest 
organism yet evolved; he stands a t  the present pinnacle of 
evolutionary progress, and his own ideas and ideals are 
pointing him t o  a path which continues in the same direc- 
tion as was followed by that progress in the past. 
On the other hand, if a tapeworm could discover and 
reflect as man does, it could not derive the same satisfaction 
from a knowledge of evolution. If, also, it could keep 
the fair-mindedness of pure reason, i t  would have to admit 
that  the path which its ancestors had trodden, the gradual 
adaptation t o  a parasitic life, the loss of limbs, of eyes and 
ears, of digestive organs, the narrow specialization which 
fits it to one and only one home, one particular part  of 
the bowels of one particular animal-it would have to  
admit that  the direction of its evolution was definitely the 
reverse of that of the chief trend of life. Life was con- 
tinually producing new combinations, new levels of existence 
were continually coming into being, and the novelty was 
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predominantly in one direction ; but the tapeworm’s move- 
ment was definitely away from this. 
Even a beautifully specialized creature like a deer, a 
bird, or a lion would (again if it could reason!) be com- 
pelled to admit that  it, too, was out of the main line. It 
would find that intense adaptation in one direction, a t  the 
expense of other directions, had invariably meant surren- 
dering the possibility of advance to a new level of biological 
progress. Over-specialization, however beautiful and in 
their way perfect its results, leaves the organism, whether 
plant, animal, or  man, in a cul-de-sac. 
Thus man, in asserting biological progress and himself 
a t  the head and front of it, is not merely projecting his 
own ways, his own work and wishes and hopes into biology, 
but is finding that his wishes and ways of working are but 
part  of something f a r  greater than himself, which was Eons 
before he ever came to the birth, and will be Eons after he 
has given birth, like Chronos, t o  his own successor and 
destroyer. H e  and his hopes do not stand isolated, a feeble 
candle flickering with pathetic bravado in the midst of an 
appalling and alien universe, but are the culmination and 
condensation of a long age of travail that has gone before. 
Here  biology becomes of profound importance to  religion, 
for here it gives to  man firm ground for his faith and tan- 
gible assurance that the belief which is in him is not vain, 
not mere delusion. This will be a corner-stone of any 
theology which attempts to  take account of science. 
Now let us return t o  the point where we left the two 
streams of scientific and religious development and started 
on our excursus into biology. Let  us look a t  the matter 
from a somewhat different angle. 
In  the Middle Ages, European civilization had a single 
underlying theory of existence. I t  found room for  all 
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aspects of the world, philosophical, scientific, devotional, 
and practical, within this one scheme; and this scheme was 
a particular elaboration of monotheism. 
Any such universal scheme must take account of all sides 
of man’s experience. This  scheme accounted for external 
nature and its operations as the creation of an absolute and 
personal God;  it satisfied man’s metaphysical needs with 
the scholastic philosophy; it accounted for  those facts and 
events of the human spirit which in theological terminology 
we call the sense of sin, conversion, the sense of grace, mys- 
tical experience, inspiration, possession, by reference to  the 
Christian scheme of theology. T h e  sense of sin depended 
on the fact of original sin, and that on the fall of man; con- 
version and grace were possible only as the result of the 
incarnation ; mystical experience was a direct communion 
with a personal God ;  inspiration was a true inspiration by 
divine beings; possession the result of the activities of 
devils, T h e  instinctive demand for justice which man feels 
in a world in which fairness seems often so conspicuously 
absent was satisfied by a system of rewards and punishments 
in another life, Plagues, earthquakes and other natural 
catastrophes were ascribed to  the anger of God;  the sense 
of the incompleteness and futility of this life, the desire 
for existence as such, and the inevitable longing that the 
partings brought about by death should not be eternal were 
met by the doctrine of personal immortality. T h e  neces= 
sity which the average man feels for authoritative guidance 
was embodied in the Church, which claimed t o  be the sole 
true interpreter of the voice of God;  the spirit of sacrifice 
was also catered for within the scheme by the establishment 
of the various religious orders; and the contrast between 
the violent world of secular life and the beliefs of the church 
could be bridged in practice by the doctrine of salvation by 
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faith, which made a holy death of more importance than 
a lawless life. In fine, every activity of man could find its 
place within this vast, dominant and coherent scheme, and 
the original basis of the scheme was the existence of a 
single omnipotent, personal God. This was assumed un- 
questioningly as the first foundation on which all the rest 
of the edifice was subsequently reared. It was the major 
premiss of the whole argument; the minor premiss was 
found in the nature of things as the men of that time saw 
and understood them ; from these premisses conclusion upon 
conclusion directly and logically flowed. 
Since that time, the advance of thought, philosophical, 
moral, and scientific, has necessitated a gradual but steady 
revision of this position. Never since the Reformation has 
there been that same triumphantly single and embracing 
outlook underlying all Western civilization. 
I have not the space for detail. Everyone knows that the 
original Western church has split into dozens of churches, 
that new religions have sprung up, that free thought has 
gradually, in the face of persecution, won for itself the right 
to  exist, and that an increasing number of thinking men and 
women are finding it impossible to  adhere to  any church. 
In every European country there are great bodies of people 
who are cramped and hindered either in their intellectual 
or their religious life or  both because of the conflict between 
orthodox science and orthodox religion. Some gain peace 
of mind by shutting their eyes to the facts of science. That  
was the case of the great scholastic philosopher Cremonini, 
who, after one look through Galileo’s telescope at  Jupiter 
and his satellites, said that he would never look through it 
again, as it was contrary to Aristotle; so, too, of an old 
lady in Western America of whom a biological friend re- 
cently told me. At a scientific soirie in the local college, 
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one of the exhibits was a living cell under the microscope; 
the old lady looked, drew back, shook her head, and said: 
“No, Professor Smith, you may look a t  such things, but 
I prefer t o  stay by my Bible.” 
Others, accepting the commonplace view of science, can 
only rationalize their state of mind and lead a self-consist- 
ent life by belittling all religion. Some, like Voltaire, brand 
the whole of it as imposture. Others regard it as a primi- 
tive survival, or  as the mere outcome of superstition; still 
others, as a beautiful figment of the imagination; they envy 
believers its enjoyment, but find that, alas, it is not for  
them. 
Some, like Jung the psychologist, have the hardihood to  
say that while they personally believe religion to  be only 
the false rationalization of primitive thought and super- 
stition, yet they also believe that it is necessary for the 
bulk of humanity, and therefore encourage its practice. 
Such a position appears, I must confess, as a denial of any 
rationality or  coherence in the universe, and is in the long 
run a counsel of despair. There are still others who 
try to  ride two horses a t  once-and find that this method 
of locomotion is neither comfortable nor very practical. 
But there are many who believe in the general reasonable- 
ness of things, and to  them it is certain that there must be 
a way out of the deadlock. I t  may be that it is in the long 
m n  our own reason which, so to  speak, gets into pheno- 
mena-but even if this extreme view were true, our reason 
none the less is reason, and is itself a product of the order 
of  things which it is making reasonable. To them it will 
seem that the time has come to  examine our premisses again, 
and to  see if a fresh start would not make it possible to  
reconcile the apparently irreconcilable. 
T h e  mediaval conception of the universe and man’s 
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relation to  it was based upon a theological premiss. T h e  
greatest single difference between the Middle Ages and 
to-day has been the rise of the scientific or naturalistic spirit, 
the investigation of nature as she is, in the search for  the 
truth of phenomena, without prejudice and in the confidence 
that truth is the first pre-requisite for mind’s right living, 
Should we not be justified in seeing what would happen if 
we took the scientific standpoint as our basis, and started 
on the construction of our philosophy of life from a natural- 
istic premiss? 
W h a t  does such a premiss imply? I t  implies, first, that 
our philosophy and view of the world must be a deduction 
from observed facts, and that supernatural and unprovable 
explanations are inadmissible when natural and scientific 
ones are available. I t  must refuse to  accept any theory or 
belief, however desirable it may seem, unless it be brought 
into some kind of harmony with the rest of our knowledge. 
I t  must accept the unity, the orderliness of nature, its co- 
herence and its congruity with itself. It must “accept the 
universe’’ and not seek to live in the imagination. 
W h a t  then are the bases for our naturalism? First we 
have the inorganic world, made intelligible to  us by physics 
and chemistry : one matter and one energy without end. Out 
of the independent electrons are organized structures of a 
higher order, the atoms; atoms join up to  inorganic mole- 
cules; and finally (so it appears is the only way in which 
we can fill the gaps in our knowledge of the past) ,  from 
more complicated carbon-containing molecules was gener- 
ated living matter. T h e  original world-stuff thus became 
progressively organized on higher and higher levels of com- 
plexity, becoming capable at  each level of new performances, 
acquiring new properties. Even the evolution of dead mat- 
ter is creative in Bergson’s sense. Living matter then takes 
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up the story, and, as we have seen, becomes organized in 
more and more complex and efficient forms, culminating 
along different lines in the ant and the bee, the giant cuttle- 
fish, the bird, and the mammal; and the mammal takes the 
highest step so f a r  taken, t o  culminate in man. 
Consciousness appears, as we usually say, in higher ani- 
mals. As we have seen, the easiest way to  look a t  this 
problem is to think of this not as a wholly new appearance, 
but as an intensification of processes a t  work from the be- 
ginning, which were not detectible before because their 
intensity was too low for  us to  detect their effect. W h a t  is 
probably a real parallel is seen in the electrical properties of 
matter. All changes in matter, dead o r  alive, are accompan- 
ied by electrical change. Every time one of our muscles con- 
tracts or glands secretes, there is a minute electric discharge 
-but so small that  i t  can only be detected by very delicate 
apparatus. But in the electric eel and a few other fish cer- 
tain muscles have been charged in such a way that they can 
administer a really powerful electric shock. It is probably 
in a parallel way that we must look a t  the brain-as an in- 
tensifier, an organ which makes it possible for mental proc- 
esses, or  a t  least processes of the same essential nature as 
those which we call mental, t o  become intensified. Doubt- 
less such essentially mental processes accompany all activity 
of dead and living matter-but a t  such a low intensity that 
they are not detected, and remain mere accidental by-prod- 
ucts. But finally in the brain the generation of intense men- 
tal processes becomes one of the main functions of the 
organ; and their presence becomes of the greatest biological 
value to  their possessor. 
T h a t  is t o  say, our naturalistic philasophy must be 
monistic-it must not assert duality of matter and spirit as 
fundamental, but must believe in their unity as different 
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aspects of a something more fundamental and more single. 
Professor Matthews, one of your leading biochemists, 
has recently voiced the same idea, which implies a t  the start 
that the purely materialist view of things is wholly false, 
since it leaves out of account the most essential aspect 
of the reality we know. 
W e  see further, as I pointed out before, that  there is a 
main direction in evolution, a biological progress, and that 
in man this progress finds its present summit. 
T h e  change from prehuman to human is comparable in 
its evolutionary importance to the change from not-life 
to life, o r  from the electronic to the atomic level of matter. 
It involves the attainment of a new level of complexity. 
Through this change, the world-stuff acquired new proper- 
ties, new possibilities of performance. T h e  precise method 
by which the change was brought about does not particu- 
larly matter t o  us. There can, however, be no doubt in the 
mind of any one who has considered the evidence, that  mod- 
ern man sprang from more beast-like prehistoric types; they 
in their turn from an organism which, though certainly not 
one of the existing anthropoid apes, was of a general ape- 
like character; this again from a type which would be classi- 
fied among the old-world tailed monkeys, this from a lemur- 
like animal, and this from some small and primitive type 
of insectivorous mammal. 
However, especially in this democratic age, more import- 
ance is attached to  a man’s performance than t o  his origins; 
and it is the results of the change which alone are of special 
interest to us in our present quest. 
T h e  new level on which man emerged when he ceased 
to be brute was characterized by the power of tool-making, 
of speech, of the power of framing concepts, of making 
use of rational thought, and, therefore, of self-conscious- 
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ness. Out of these original properties are automatically 
generated the further properties which characterize man 
as  man. Other properties, such as gregarious instinct, ma- 
ternal love, the erect posture, and so forth, are found in 
other creatures as well. 
One of the direct consequences of the step was the crea- 
tion of a set of conscious values. Animals can pursue one 
end in preference to  another, but they apparently are in- 
capable of framing a set of conscious values with reference 
to these ends. W h a t  is more, what we may call the uncon- 
scious values of the animal are supplemented in man by a 
whole new crop of conscious values of a different character. 
Through his power of framing concepts and thinking logi- 
cally, man can construct so-called absolute values. Men 
can understand what is meant by abstract ideas such as truth, 
justice, love, beauty, and will regulate their lives by them. 
As reason and good-will work on the problem of existence, 
values change, and often ideas that once seemed incompat- 
ible are later found to  be mutually helpful. This is one of 
the greatest difficulties in the intercourse between different 
nations, classes, sects, and individuals-in part  that  the 
various parties have a different scale of values, in part that 
their values are on different levels. When this last is the 
case, intelligent and full intercourse is impossible-the two 
parties are really speaking different languages. 
As further results of the change, new activities and new 
kinds of behavior, previously unknown in evolutionary his- 
tory, are brought into being. Only among mankind, not 
among dogs, birds, or ants, do we find science, literature, 
religion, art,  laws, political activity. Now, this is where 
many materialistically-inclined minds appear t o  go astray. 
They are  willing enough to  analyse those parts of human 
activity which allow of such analysis into a set of chemical 
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and physical processes; but when they are confronted with 
phenomena not analysable into physics and chemistry, they 
simply ignore them or  attempt to  explain them away. But 
these, just as much as the others, are phenomena. They 
are all part  of the single reality of nature. While science 
was still preeminently chemical and physical science, such 
an attitude was more or less natural; but the rise of biology 
and psychology makes the position futile. T h e  material- 
istic science of the latter half of the past century could be 
materialistic only because it was incomplete. T h e  science 
of to-day must be monistic, and take the mental as well as 
the material properties of the world-stuff into consideration. 
Science must attempt to  explain the existence of scientific 
enquiry itself; among the raw materials of which it must 
take account are facts such as that men are willing to  die 
for an idea, or  t o  devote their lives to the pursuit of beauty. 
T h e  almost universal existence of religion, in one form o r  
another among men, is equally a fact of science with the 
fact that  water is made of molecules each consisting of two 
atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, or that the stomach 
secretes a digestive juice. Our new premiss thus rejects 
supernaturalism and demands a naturalistic attitude towards 
religion. 
T h a t  being so, science asks, “What  then is religion in 
practice?” It examines all the religions of humanity, sav- 
age, barbaric, and civilized, and orders its results. And 
so we have a new branch of science-the Comparative 
History of Religion. 
Some of it we 
have briefly touched on in the early part  of this lecture. 
Looked a t  from our present standpoint, the most important 
fact which emerges from it is the universal or  almost univer- 
sal existence of a religious sentiment, or, as it is often inaccur- 
W h a t  have we gained by such a study? 
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ately called, a religious sense or  instinct, in humanity. View- 
ing man biologically, as would the proverbial Martian 
scientist, we thus find that one of his characteristic activities 
is religion, in the same way as is hive-building to  a bee, o r  
contraction to a muscle. This, of course, tells us nothing 
of the desirability, or  otherwise, of religion. 
W e  have, however, not yet asked ourselves the question, 
what religion is, in what its essence consists. To  many, the 
idea of a personal God is taken as  being an essential part  
of any and every religion. Even such a capable thinker as 
Martineau fell into this error. Somehow or  other he and 
others who have the same idea manage to  forget the fact 
that  Buddhism, one of the three great historic religions 
of the world, is in its true form (still practiced by very 
large numbers of people) completely atheistic. It neither 
denies nor affirms a god; it manages to  exist and t o  satisfy 
the religious craving of its devotees without one. 
T h e  study of primitive religion has further revealed a 
whole level of religious thought in which no conception of 
God o r  gods existed, but where, since no clear demarcation 
seems to  have been made between self and not-self, there 
was a fine confused theory of existence in which inanimate 
forces and human personality, matter and spirit, imagina- 
tion and reality, wishes and facts were all inextricably inter- 
woven, giving us the fetichism, animism and magic of the 
earliest religions. 
Many and various other definitions of religion have been 
given. After thinking over a number of them, I tried to 
frame one myself, which I shall venture to quote to you 
because no less a personage than Dean Inge held it up as 
one of the best he knew. “Religion,” I wrote, “religion, 
itself, is the reaction between man as a personality on the 
one side, and, on the other, all of the universe with which 
Philosophical Biology 331 
he comes into contact.” And I still feel that that  embraces 
most of the facts of religion, without being too broad to  
admit other activities within its bounds. 
Further, we can trace a higher and a lower in religion, 
a progress in its evolution as in other evolution. Undoubt- 
edly, monotheism represents an advance on polytheism or  
fetichism ; undoubtedly, the highest forms of Christianity 
have rid themselves of superstitions, fears, and barbaric 
rituals with which earlier religions have been encumbered. 
Undoubtedly, too, the ideas embodied in the orthodox be- 
liefs of Christianity represent (if I may use the word rep-  
resent in a rather special sense), the realities of actual ex- 
perience very closely and often very wonderfully. 
But (and you will now see why I use the word r e p r e s e n t ) ,  
a representation may be of various kinds. It may, for in- 
stance, be realistic like a photograph; or  it may be highly 
symbolic, like many works of a r t  and literature. 
It is my personal belief, which I put before you for what 
it is worth, that  the representation of religious reality given 
by orthodox Christianity is in many important respects only 
symbolic, and that that is the reason why it conflicts with 
modern knowledge. 
In  religious practice and experience the Christian churches 
(o r  some of them) are more advanced than any others. 
T h e  facts of the religious life t o  which Christianity devotes 
special attention are  the highest and most essential facts. 
T h e  sense of sin and of atonement; communion; the fruits 
of meditation; the experience of conversion and of grace; 
the value of humility, self-sacrifice and love; the hunger 
and thirst after righteousness; the desire fo r  a unified and 
coherent explanation of the universe in which we find our- 
selves-these, and many others which I could mention, are 
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facts of reality which must be taken into account, and taken 
into account especially by religion. 
But the particular way in which they are accounted for,  
the particular forms which they are given by Christianity- 
these need not necessarily have more than symbolic value. 
T h a t  is already a great value. But we must be careful not 
to let the symbolism come into open conflict with hard fact 
-which it can only do when it believes itself also to  be hard 
fact. 
I n  my belief, the fundamental symbolization of Chris- 
tianity is the symbolization of the forces acting in the uni- 
verse as a personal, omnipotent, divine being. I t  is this one 
interpretation of reality that provides the premiss for that 
whole set of conclusions which are the bone of contention 
between Christianity and Science to-day. 
If we proceed dispassionately, and in the same scientific 
spirit with which we analyse other phenomena, t o  analyse 
the idea of God as actually held by men of various religions 
a t  various times in the world’s history, it is possible to find 
out what minimum and what maximum of meaning attaches 
to  the idea of God in this, we may say, anthropological 
usage of the term. Let  me read what I have written else- 
where on this subject.l 
W e  may either call the sum of the forces acting in the 
cosmos the manifestations of God, who in this case must be 
the Absolute God, and unknowable except through these 
manifestations, o r  we may confine the term God to its anthro- 
pological usage, as denoting the actual objects of human reli- 
gion, in which case we must admit that the term God as 
understood by man is constituted by man’s idea of the forces 
acting in the cosmos, so that not only are these forces involved, 
not only a possible Absolute God behind them, but also the 
organizing power of the human mind. 
I wish you here to agree to my adopting the second alter- 
native. . . . W e  can therefore now say that God is one, but 
* “Essays of a Biologist,” London, 1923, pp, 262-265, 283-284. 
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that though one, has several aspects. There is one aspect of 
God which is neutral to us, in a way hostile, mere Power 
operating in the vastness of the stellar universes, apprehended 
only as orderly, tending in a direction which appears to be in 
the long run inimical. . . . There  is another aspect, which is 
the one seen operating in that sphere which comprises the 
whole of life upon this earth. . . . This  aspect of God is our  
refuge and guarantee, for here we find our assurance that our 
human life is a part of a whole that is not antagonistic, but 
moves in the same general direction as do our history and our 
aims. There does exist, in Matthew Arnold’s phrase, ‘‘a 
power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.” And 
this second aspect is not wholly separate from the first, . . . 
for the first is its parent, physically and temporally, and the 
direction of biological progress is the continuation of a line 
of development marked out, within the opposed inorganic 
direction, even from the first. 
Next, there is . . . the third aspect of God, which en- 
shrines the directive forces operating in man. These direc- 
tive forces are our instincts, our needs, our values, our ideals. 
When those are harmonized with each other and with the 
outer world by reason and experience, they form a power 
which we can see has been directive, normative in the past, 
and will continue to be so in the future. . . . Although in 
a sense this aspect is the smallest, as comprising the smallest 
physical field, yet in another i t  is the largest, since man’s 
ideals are in themselves unlimited, non-finite. . . . This  third 
aspect is again historically the offspring of the second, and 
through the second of the first. . . . 
God in this sense is the universe, not as such, but so far 
as grasped as a whole by a mind, embodied in an idea, and in 
consequence capable of influencing that mind, and through it 
the whole course of events. . . . There exists no other mean- 
ing of the term which, on analysis, is found to convey any- 
thing scientific or  comprehensible to us. W e  may reason that 
there is an Absolute [Personal] God behind the universe and 
our idea of it. But we have no proof of this statement, and 
such an Absolute God is, as Spencer pointed out, an Un- 
knowable, and accordingly no concern of ours. T h a t  part and 
those aspects of the universe which have been grasped by us 
are proving to contain the key to many of our difficulties; 
meanwhile we can only be humble and admit that our idea 
of God, even in this restricted sense, is still extremely incom- 
plete: and in this sense there is a God far greater than our 
present idea and knqwledge of God, only waiting to be 
discovered. , . . 
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By organizing our knowledge of outer reality after the 
pattern of a personality, we make i t  possible for it t o  inter- 
penetrate our private personality. If, therefore, we have, 
in any true sense of the word, “found religion,” it means 
that we shall have so organized our minds that, for flashes a t  
least, we attain to a sense of interpenetration with the reality 
around us-that reality which includes not only the celestial 
bodies, the rocks and waters, not only evolving life, but also 
other human beings, also ideas, also ideals. 
This,  to my mind, is what actually happens when men speak 
of communion with God. It is a setting, an organizing of 
our experiences of the universe in relation with the driving 
forces of our soul or  mental being, so that the two are united 
and harmonized. There is a resolution of conflicts, an attain- 
ment of profound serenity, a conviction that the experience is 
of the utmost value and importance. 
It is a relating of 
the personality as a unit to external reality as a unit-and in 
a relation of harmony. First the inner structure of the mind 
must be organized into a harmonious unit, then our knowl- 
edge of external reality organized similarly, and finally, in 
religious experience, the two must be harmonized in inter- 
penetrating union. 
. . . Here we see religion in operation. 
T h a t  is t o  say, it is possible to  say that the term God is 
a term denoting the sum of the forces of the cosmos as per- 
ceived by and acting upon mind, and symbolized as a 
personality. 
T h a t  this statement of the case should be possible and 
even coherent does not imply that it is true. T h e  reality 
is often f a r  more complex and far more wonderful than our 
human approximations. I merely speak of it as a solution, 
which, a t  my present stage of intellectual development, satis- 
fies me and has helped me to  bridge the rift between science 
and religion which for many years appeared unbridgeable. 
In  any event, what I am firmly convinced of is that the 
naturalistic view of religion, which has been made possible 
only by evolutionary biology and psychology, is right in its 
fundamental tenet. It assures us that religion is a natural 
and high function of the human mind, not something de- 
Philosophical Biology 335 
pendent only on authority, o r  on revelation, or  on ritual 
or propitiatory sacrifice. 
I spoke in my previous lecture of health as an a r t  like 
other kinds of living. Religion, too, is an art, which must 
be practiced vitally if it is to have the fullest meaning and 
value. 
Too many men and women, though passively accepting 
the orthodox formulations of their church’s creed, are still 
really in the magic stage as regards their religious practice. 
They regard religion as alchemy regarded the philosopher’s 
stone, as something external t o  them, which you can obtain, 
and with which once obtained you can perform all sorts 
of miraculous tricks, such as attaining salvation a t  one 
bound, o r  being entitled t o  look down on believers in any 
other creeds as heathen or  heretics. 
Such ideas are the ideas of a savage o r  of an undisci- 
plined mind which has not reached a higher level of thinking 
than the savage. Precisely as with health, or with love, or  
with the scientific spirit, religion is an active internal prin- 
ciple, a natural function of the living man-or it is nothing. 
I will read you, if I may, a couple of quotations. The  first 
is from the pen of Soderblom, the Archbishop of Upsala. 
H e  speaks of a certain attitude of mind towards purely in- 
tellectual negative criticism, and says: “I feel it . . . most 
markedly in strong young intelligences in Germany which 
are passing through the ordeal of starvation and humili- 
ation. They say: ‘Thanks, we have had enough of modern- 
ism. I t  was a helpful drug to  a previous generation, 
agonizing under the pressure of tyrannical formulas and a 
Bible-worship lacking the historic view. But now we have 
had enough of it. W e  have the great epoch of historic 
research in Holy W r i t  and religions behind us. It is most 
interesting to know more and more of the relativities of 
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history in their interdependence. But our hungering soul 
cannot feed on them. Modernists sometimes forget that 
the walls, not the windows, make the building. Where in the 
moving phenomena of religious evolution is the rock, 
the Tru th  ?’ An eminent young German theologian has 
called that tendency : das H e i m w e h  nach d e m  Unbedingten, 
the nostalgia after the unconditioned. I am persuaded that 
metaphysics and systematic construction will occupy in the 
next generation of religious research the same dominating 
place that historical investigation has had in our times.” 
In fact he implies that future work will be chiefly devoted 
to  a search for  the underlying basis of religious experience, 
and a definite attempt a t  new positive construction on that 
foundation. 
Let  me read you a quotation from that sane and sage 
spirit, Havelock Ellis : 
“How is Religion still possible?” This  question is posed 
by so able a thinker as Dr.  Merz as the question of para- 
mount importance, and he can find only a paradoxical answer. 
It is a question which still seems to be taken seriously by 
many otherwise intelligent persons who are thereby stranded 
in the end on all sorts of hidden sandbanks. They do not ask: 
H o w  is Walking still possible? They do not ask: How is 
Hunger still possible? Yet it is really the same kind of 
question. 
It is always marvelous to find how people worry themselves 
over unnecessary problems and spin the most fantastic webs 
of abstruse speculation around even the simplest things. Re- 
ligion, if it is anything at all, must be a natural organic func- 
tion, like walking, like eating, better still, one may say, like 
loving. For the closest analogy, and indeed real relationship, 
of religion, is with the function of reproduction and the emo- 
tions of sex. T h e  functions of walking and eating are more 
or  less necessary to life in their rhythmic recurrence, and it is 
legitimate in their absence to endeavor to stimulate them into 
action. But the function of religion, like that of love, is not 
‘The Forum, 1924, p. 334. ’ Ibid., pp. 324-5. 
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necessary to life, nor may it with any certainty be stimulated 
into activity. Need i t ?  These functions are either working 
within you or they are not. If not, then it is clear that your 
organism is in no need of them at the present moment, and 
perhaps is born without the aptitude to experience them. And 
if so, there are those who will tell you that you represent a 
superior type of humanity. Therefore whether if not so, or 
whether so, why worry? 
I do not, indeed, myself think that the inaptitude for the 
function of religion-ancient as the religious emotions are,- 
represents a higher stage of development. But I am sure that 
either the function is there or it is not there, and that no 
intellectual speculations will take its place or  hasten its mani- 
festation. Religion, like love, develops and harmonizes our 
rarest and most extravagant emotions. It exalts us above the 
commonplace routine of our daily life, and it makes us supreme 
over the world. But, like love also, it is a little ridiculous to 
those who are unable to experience it. And since they can 
survive quite well without experiencing it, let them be thank- 
ful, as we also are thankful. 
If we are conditioned beings, produced by an evolution 
which has always been related to  the world around, one- 
sided, unfinished-and this is the humility which biology 
enjoins-we cannot afford to  be intolerant, for such pre- 
sumption becomes ridiculous. 
Furthermore, our toleration must not be merely passive, 
a tired intellectual gesture; it must be active, springing 
from the belief and knowledge that truth is too large to  be 
revealed in but one form, or  one creed, or  one way of life. 
W e  must really accept the hard saying that out of diver- 
sity alone comes advance, and that any one human mind 
is too small to grasp more than a little truth, to live more 
than a little reality. 
Listen to one more quotation from Havelock Ellis : “The 
diversity of the world, therefore, is natural. Yet not less 
natural is this inability to accept its own diversity. I t  is 
by limitation,-the limitation which all ar t  involves,-that 
Nature becomes diverse, fantastic, seemingly artificial. It 
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is by that same limitation that these diverse forms cannot 
accept each other. I recall the critical, disdainful gaze of 
a small terrier as he stood still t o  watch a great goose pass 
by. Let  us, therefore, accept with joy the diversity of the 
world, and with equal joy its inability to accept its own 
diversity. 
I must close, and I will do so by affirming another belief 
which I hold tenaciously. I t  is that only by having some 
ground-work of common belief, will it be possible for 
humanity to set out with a happy prospect of success upon 
the problems which press on it from every side. There is, 
at  present, not only a conflict between the beliefs of ortho- 
dox science and orthodox religion, but also between those 
of nationalism and internationalism, and of materialism 
and idealism, Yet a common underlying basis would help 
solve all the antitheses. 
I t  is possible for such a common basis t o  be attained: it 
is only possible for it t o  be attained by utilizing every source 
of knowledge and feeling: and it will, I believe, be found 
that biology has made some of the most important contri- 
butions on the intellectual side towards the construction of 
such a basis. 
F o r  that also is delightful.” 1 
JULIAN S. HUXLEY. 
‘Ibid. ,  p. 326. 


